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FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL
MONITORING OF CONVICTED SEX OFFENDERS
Ben A. McJunkin * and J.J. Prescott 
(forthcoming New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 21, Summer 2018)
ABSTRACT
More than forty U.S. states currently track at least some of their convicted sex offenders
using GPS devices. Many offenders will be monitored for life. The burdens and expense
of living indefinitely under constant technological monitoring have been well
documented, but most commentators have assumed that these burdens were of no
constitutional moment because states have characterized such surveillance as “civil” in
character—and courts have seemed to agree. In 2015, however, the Supreme Court
decided in Grady v. North Carolina that attaching a GPS monitoring device to a person
was a Fourth Amendment search, notwithstanding the ostensibly civil character of the
surveillance. Grady left open the question whether the search—and the state’s
technological monitoring program more generally—was constitutionally reasonable. This
Essay considers the doctrine and theory of Fourth Amendment reasonableness as it
applies to both current and envisioned sex offender monitoring technologies to evaluate
whether the Fourth Amendment may serve as an effective check on post-release
monitoring regimes.
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INTRODUCTION
The technological monitoring of sex offenders is not a new phenomenon. 1 It has,
however, become an increasingly popular one. Laws subjecting convicted sex offenders to some
form of technological monitoring, often for very long terms or lifetimes, have multiplied in the
past decade. 2 Rapid technological advancements now permit relatively low-cost location
tracking twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week. 3 Some legal scholars have lauded these
developments because technological monitoring of sex offenders appears to impose “minimal
intrusion” compared to alternative forms of social control. 4 Yet that claim has rarely been
examined in detail. In fact, courts have largely assumed that the intrusion imposed by
technological monitoring was insufficiently serious to warrant constitutional scrutiny. 5 That is,
until the Supreme Court upset this easy assumption.
In March 2015, the Supreme Court held in Grady v. North Carolina that attaching a
device to a person’s body to track their movements, without consent, is a search subject to

1

See Avlana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 146–48 (2017) (documenting
the development and expansion of sex offender monitoring around the turn of the century). Throughout
this Essay, we use the term “technological monitoring” (and variants of this term) to refer not only to the
variety of location-based tracking authorized by current sex offender laws—including satellite-based
Global Positioning System (GPS) devices and radio frequency (RF) transmitters—but also more broadly
to any deployment of current or future technology in a manner that permits individualized tracking and
observation.
2
See discussion infra Part I.
3
Further, under many state statutes, the costs of maintaining technological monitoring are passed on
to the offender subject to monitoring. See, e.g., Rhonda Cook, Sex Offender Argues Mandatory Ankle
Monitors Are Unconstitutional, THE ATL. J.-CONST. (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.myajc.com/news/local/
sex-offender-argues-mandatory-ankle-monitors-are-unconstitutional/SaXCToWMJ3wgmFm2mvMuzN/.
4
See Pamela Foohey, Applying the Lessons of GPS Monitoring of Batterers to Sex Offenders, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 281, 284 (2008). Although our observations here are focused on the monitoring
of sex offenders, the future of criminal justice is likely to include increased technological monitoring in
lieu of punishment. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric, Dan Hunter, & Gabrielle Wolf, Technological Incarceration
and the End of the Prison Crisis, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 77 (2018) (proposing technological
and remote surveillance as a substitute for physical incarceration). The insights of this Essay therefore
may have extended applicability, both for litigants fighting for less intrusive monitoring laws and for
legal actors and institutions wishing to monitor individuals in a constitutional manner.
5
Constitutional challenges to sex offender monitoring programs—historically mounted under legal
frameworks, such as the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the Eighth Amendment, that do not treat the intrusiveness of monitoring as doctrinally salient—have
typically been unsuccessful. See Nicholas Corsaro, Note, Sex, Gadgets, and the Constitution—A Look at
the Massachusetts Sex Offender GPS-Tracking Statute, 48 SUFFOLK L. REV. 401, 414–19 (2015).
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judicial review for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 6 The Court declined to decide
the question whether North Carolina’s monitoring requirement was reasonable. But it did offer
general guidance to lower courts reviewing monitoring programs: “The reasonableness of a
search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the
search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.” 7
Grady thus provides a new constitutional lens for analyzing sex offender monitoring programs,
one that explicitly invites examination of the intrusion experienced by the individual through
application of the Fourth Amendment’s longstanding search-and-seizure principles.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the substance and
diversity of current laws authorizing the technological monitoring of convicted sex offenders. It
situates these monitoring regimes within the rapid historical development of laws regulating
convicted sex offenders more generally—such as sex offender registries, reporting and
notification requirements, and inclusion and exclusion zones. It also discusses the welldocumented burdens and disabilities that technological monitoring imposes on those subject to
surveillance. Part II reports the recent developments in the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that have opened the door for new legal challenges to the intrusion of
technological monitoring. It examines both the Grady decision and its predicate case, United
States v. Jones, which unsettled the conventional understanding of when governmental use of
technological monitoring qualifies as a search. It also explains the framework for resolving the
ultimate question of the constitutionality of sex offender monitoring laws—whether the
monitoring, as a search, is “unreasonable.”
Part III is the heart of the Essay. It identifies and explores several distinct dimensions
along which the technological monitoring of sex offenders may be considered especially
intrusive. It links the identified dimensions of intrusion to both existing Fourth Amendment
doctrines and contemporary scholarly theories about the Amendment’s future. In so doing, it
highlights several pressure points, where the implementation of technological monitoring
regimes for sex offenders may need to be curtailed or tailored to accommodate longstanding
6

Grady, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015). The law at issue in Grady created a satellite-based monitoring
program that maintained time-correlated and continuous tracking of the geographic location of the subject
and required reporting of subject’s violations of prescriptive and proscriptive schedule or location
requirements. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §14-208.40(c) (West 2017).
7
Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371.
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interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, such as privacy, bodily integrity, and human
dignity. Part IV picks up where Part III ends, anticipating and evaluating two theoretical avenues
that governments who seek to legislate around the Fourth Amendment might explore, concluding
that such attempts would be limited in their efficacy.
Ultimately, this Essay asks a simple, but fundamental question: To what extent does the
Fourth Amendment actually constrain whether and how monitoring technologies can be used to
surveil sex offenders (or even criminal offenders more broadly)? In answering that question, we
seek to accomplish two goals. First, we aim to inform and educate legal actors who have a vested
interest in ensuring the constitutionality and reasonableness of sex offender monitoring laws,
whether they are legislators designing monitoring regimes for the benefit of their constituents or
litigants seeking to find a way out from under particularly invasive monitoring requirements.
Second, we interject ourselves into this discrete moment of constitutional uncertainty to help
ensure that open foundational questions of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are resolved
thoughtfully and conscientiously, despite arising in a context—the regulation of convicted sex
offenders—that can spur strong emotions and lead to hasty conclusions.
I.

The State of Sex Offender Monitoring
Sometime near the start of the twenty-first century, states began to use technology to

monitor formerly incarcerated sex offenders. 8 Florida, California, and Massachusetts led the
way. 9 By 2006, more than twenty states monitored sex offenders with technological devices. 10
As of 2015, the number of states had grown to more than forty. 11 The statutory basis for sex
offender monitoring varies from state to state. Some states, such as Wisconsin and North
Carolina, make it available upon a convicted sex offender’s release from civil commitment. 12
8

See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 147–48; Eric M. Dante, Comment, Tracking the Constitution—The
Proliferation and Legality of Sex-Offender GPS-Tracking Statutes, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1169, 1169
(2012); ASSOCIATED PRESS, States Track Sex Offenders by GPS, WIRED (July 30, 2005),
https://www.wired.com/2005/07/states-track-sex-offenders-by-gps/.
9
Dante, supra note 8, at 1172.
10
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE CRIME LEGISLATION IN 2006, 1–2
(2007), http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/2006crime.pdf.
11
Dante, supra note 8, at 1172; Richard Wolf, High Court Orders Review of Sex Offender GPS
Monitoring, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/03/30/supreme-court-sex-offender-gps/70544348/.
12
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.30B.

3
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/187
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198319

4

McJunkin and Prescott:

Other states, such as California and Alaska, make it a condition of parole or probation. 13 At least
one state, Michigan, imposes sex offender monitoring as part of the sentence imposed at
conviction for a number of specified sex offenses. 14
Technological monitoring programs for sex offenders differ on other fronts, too. In
pointing this out, we are not about to embark on presenting a complete picture of monitoring
regimes in the United States. We will instead simply offer a few examples to highlight how
much variation there is along different dimensions. One example is whether monitoring is
discretionary. In some states, the decisions whether and how to impose monitoring require an
individualized assessment from a neutral decisionmaker. 15 Depending on the state, this may be
either a judge or a parole board. 16 In other states, at least for certain offenses, monitoring is
mandatory. 17 Similar diversity exists with respect to the duration of technological monitoring. At
least seven states, at least for certain crimes, require monitoring for life. 18
Technological monitoring numbers among a broad gamut of laws regulating convicted
sex offenders. Legislation aimed specifically at sex offenders dates as far back as the 1930s,
when many states passed laws permitting the indefinite civil commitment of “sexual
psychopaths.” 19 In the 1990s, a new wave of civil commitment laws—this time styled as “sexual
predator” laws—gained momentum, committing offenders in addition to (not in lieu of) their
13

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.100(f) (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004 (West 2012).
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520n(1) (2006).
15
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-30(a)(14) (2017) (permitting judges to impose monitoring);
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-84 (2014) (permitting judges to impose GPS monitoring as condition of
parole); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-123.91(c) (West 2007) (permitting judges complete discretion as to
imposing monitoring on certain sex offenders); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4) (McKinney 2010)
(permitting court to impose monitoring when it will “advance public safety.”).
16
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-302(b)(1) (2014) (granted parole board authority to impose
monitoring); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.704(5) (2016) (permitting Department of Corrections to impose
monitoring).
17
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004(b) (2012); FLA. STAT. § 948.30 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 421-14(e) (2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-723(c)(1)(i), (d)(3)(i) (2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
265 § 47; MICH. COMP. LAWS 750.520n(1) (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-208.40, 208.40A(c) (2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-8.2.1 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2011).
18
Corsaro, supra note 5, at 412; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004(b) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 421-14(e) (2016); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 11-723(c)(1)(i), (d)(3)(i) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.520n(1) (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40, 208.40A(c)
(2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-8.2.1 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2011).
19
See, e.g., Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43, 55
(1998); Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the “Sex Psychopath” Statute: From the
Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 897 (1995).
14
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prison terms. 20 Legal regulations governing post-release sex offenders rapidly proliferated
following Congress’s passage of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offenders Registration Act in 1994, which required states to generate registries of
convicted sex offenders. 21 Within a few years, every state had its own sex offender registration
law. Registries were soon followed by community notification laws, conventionally known as
Megan’s Law, 22 which made these registries public. Before long, residency, employment, and
travel restrictions were added to the list. 23
Constitutional challenges to the legal regulation of sex offenders have met with little
overall success. In 1997, the Supreme Court upheld Kansas’s civil commitment statute,
concluding that the law comported with due process, did not subject the offender to double
jeopardy, and was not an ex post facto punishment. 24 In 2003, the Court similarly rejected an ex
post facto challenge to Alaska’s sex offender registration and community notification laws, and a
due process challenge to Connecticut’s online sex offender registry. 25 Although a few state
supreme courts, federal district courts, and federal courts of appeal have struck down particularly
onerous or vague sex offender registration, notification, and residency restriction laws in recent
years, most courts remain unmoved. 26 In large part, laws regulating sex offenders have been
insulated from constitutional scrutiny by their ostensibly “civil” character, notwithstanding their
clear ties to issues of crime and punishment. 27 Legal challenges to the technological monitoring
of sex offenders are only just beginning to percolate through the courts, but to date, these have
not shown much promise of altering this trend. 28

20

Corsaro, supra note 5, at 404.
42 U.S.C. § 14071.
22
The laws are so named because Congressional support for sex offender registration was spurred by
the death of Megan Kanka at the hands of a convicted child molester. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89
(2003) (explaining that Kanka’s death inspired legislative action).
23
See J.J. Prescott, Portmanteau Ascendant: Post-Release Regulations and Sex Offender Recidivism,
48 CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2016).
24
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
25
Smith, 538 U.S. at 105–06; Conn. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
26
See Wayne A. Logan, Current and Emerging Challenges to SORN Laws and Policies, (in this
Issue).
27
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 161–66.
28
Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding Tennessee’s sex offender
monitoring statute in the face of another ex post facto claim).
21

5
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/187
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198319

6

McJunkin and Prescott:

II.

Searching Sex Offenders
Historically, the Fourth Amendment has not offered purchase for pushback to laws

regulating convicted sex offenders. 29 However, a “quiet revolution” in Fourth Amendment law
may reveal hitherto unrealized constraints on the permissible scope of technological monitoring
of convicted sex offenders. 30 This Part outlines the current state of Fourth Amendment law as it
pertains to sex offender monitoring regimes. It traces the re-emergence of the so-called
“trespass” test for identifying whether particular governmental conduct effects a search, the
development that laid the groundwork for extending Fourth Amendment protections to
technological monitoring of sex offenders. It then outlines the “reasonableness” framework for
assessing whether a given search—and ultimately a state’s sex offender monitoring scheme—is
constitutional. Using a recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals as a lens, it
concludes by highlighting the range of governmental interests likely to hold sway with courts
that must be weighed against the intrusiveness of a given monitoring regime.
A.

Property and Privacy: Reorienting the Fourth Amendment Inquiry

For most of the last fifty years, the arc of Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence was
thought to be linear. The text of the Fourth Amendment secures “persons, houses, papers, and
effects” against searches and seizures that are unreasonable. 31 Consistent with that text, early
Fourth Amendment protections largely tracked private property rights—a “search” occurred
when the government physically invaded a constitutionally protected space. 32 In the late 1960s,
however, Katz v. United States signaled a sea change in constitutional search analysis. Declaring
29

See, e.g., Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge
to sex offender registration act); Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
Fourth Amendment challenge to requirement that registered sex offenders provide state with online
identifiers and passwords); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting Fourth
Amendment challenge to creation of sex offender DNA data bank).
30
See Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Andrew Tutt, Offensive Searches: Toward A Two-Tier Theory of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 104 (2017).
31
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32
Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464 (1928) (holding that no Fourth
Amendment “search” occurred where the government tapped telephone wires outside of a suspect’s
premises), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1942) (holding that no Fourth
Amendment “search” occurred where the government placed a recording device against the outer wall of
a suspect’s office), with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding that a Fourth
Amendment “search” occurred when the government inserted a microphone into a suspect’s wall because
that action constituted a legal trespass).
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that “the Constitution protects people, not places,” the Katz Court announced that a search occurs
whenever a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy is violated, regardless of whether the
invasion attended a physical trespass. 33 In the conventional telling of this story, the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test that emerged from Katz was an evolution (or perhaps revolution) that
replaced the classic trespass doctrine and reoriented the Fourth Amendment around notions of
privacy rather than property. 34 In the decades following Katz, many other traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrines were similarly recast in the language of privacy. 35
The Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Jones, however, unsettled this
account of Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence. Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice
Scalia proclaimed that Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test “has been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” 36 Ironically, the impetus for resuscitating the
decades-old trespass doctrine was the government’s deployment of modern monitoring
technology. In Jones, federal agents had secretly installed a GPS tracking device on the
defendant’s vehicle without a valid warrant to do so. 37 Under the Supreme Court’s historical
precedents, the information collected by the GPS device—the movement of an automobile on
public roads—was arguably not private. 38 Thus, the government’s actions were unlikely to run

33

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“We conclude that . . . the ‘trespass’ doctrine . . .
can no longer be regarded as controlling. . . . The fact that the electronic devices employed to achieve that
end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”).
34
See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 67–
68 (2013).
35
For example, the Supreme Court had long held that no Fourth Amendment “search” occurs when
police investigate open fields because of an old common law distinction between open fields and houses,
only the latter of which are explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). Following Katz, the Supreme Court has couched the same result in the rhetoric of
privacy, holding that “an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of
doors in fields.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
36
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012). Throughout this Essay, we occasionally refer to the rule
articulated in Jones, as Justice Scalia did, as a “trespass” test. While we find this a useful shorthand, the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence both before and since Jones evidences that the test
does not require an actual trespass, in the legal sense, but rather a physical occupation of a private space.
See generally Kerr, supra note 34.
37
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03.
38
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.”). The District Court in Jones had suppressed any GPS data collected while vehicle was parked
in a private garage. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part on other grounds
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afoul of the Katz test, barring some novel proclamation from the Court about the quantum of
information gathered or the technological means employed. 39 Instead, the Jones Court ruled that
the installation of the GPS device itself was a Fourth Amendment search, irrespective of the
privacy of the information collected. 40 Emphasizing that the government “physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” Justice Scalia reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment must, at a minimum, provide today’s citizens with the same protection
against trespassory governmental surveillance that it afforded at the time it was adopted. 41 In its
next Term, the Court again eschewed the Katz test in a Fourth Amendment case, emphasizing
instead the “physical intrusion” involved in a police dog search of the curtilage of a home. 42
Jones set the stage for the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Grady v. North Carolina. 43
The Grady case involved a challenge to a North Carolina statute imposing satellite-based
monitoring on recidivist sex offenders. 44 By authority of the statute, Dale Grady was ordered to
wear a monitoring device at all times for the rest of his life. 45 The state courts had rejected
Grady’s claims that the monitoring was an unconstitutional search or seizure, reasoning that the
lessons of Jones did not extend into a non-investigative context—North Carolina’s monitoring
program was civil in nature, and its purported aim was not the collection of evidence but rather

sub nom. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
39
Supreme Court commentators had anticipated that the case would be a test of the “mosaic” theory
of Fourth Amendment searches, which holds that the aggregation of large quantities of erstwhile nonprivate information may violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Orin Kerr, Supreme Court
Agrees to Review Case on GPS and the Fourth Amendment, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 27, 2011),
http://volokh.com/2011/06/27/supreme-court-agrees-to-review-case-on-gps-and-the-fourth-amendment/.
For more on the mosaic theory, see discussion infra Part III.B.
40
Jones, 565 U.S. at 402, 411–12.
41
Id. at 404–05, 411. See also id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the trespass test as
“an irreducible constitutional minimum”). The commitment to preserving historical levels of
constitutional protection in the face of emerging technology has been championed in recent years by
Professor Orin Kerr. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011). Previously, a similar sentiment had been advanced by
Professor Geoffrey Stone. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the
Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1193 (1976). For
counterarguments, see David Alan Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 233–41 (2015).
42
See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
43
Grady, 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015).
44
Id. at 1369. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14–208.40(a)(1), 14–208.40B (2013).
45
Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1369.
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the deterrence of future crimes. 46 The Supreme Court, however, rejected those distinctions,
reminding the courts below (and the rest of us) that the Fourth Amendment has a long history
governing civil searches for purposes other than the collection of criminal evidence. 47 In a per
curium opinion, the Grady Court announced simply that the North Carolina monitoring program
involves a Fourth Amendment search because it “is plainly designed to obtain information” and
“does so by physically intruding on a subject’s body.” 48
The consensus lesson of Jones (and Grady) is that the nonconsensual, physical
occupation of “persons, houses, papers, and effects” for the purpose of collecting information
triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny, separate and apart from any claim to the privacy of the
information that results from that occupation. 49 But this is at most a half-victory for those
concerned about limiting the potential excesses of technological governmental surveillance.
After all, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. 50 Although Jones and
Grady both held that a “search” had occurred, and thus that each governmental effort was subject
to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, both cases left open the question whether those
searches were unreasonable (and hence constitutionally impermissible). The Jones Court
concluded that the government had waived its argument that GPS monitoring was reasonable by
failing to raise it in the Court of Appeals. 51 The Grady Court, meanwhile, expressly declined to
analyze the reasonableness of North Carolina’s satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders
regime in the first instance, punting the issue to the state courts. 52
46

See State v. Grady, 759 S.E.2d 712 (N.C. App. 2014) (relying on State v. Jones, 750 S.E.2d 883
(2013)); see also Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371 (noting that “the North Carolina Court of Appeals apparently
placed decisive weight on the fact that the State’s monitoring program is civil in nature”).
47
Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371.
48
Id.
49
See, e.g., William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1834 (2016) (“Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment protects against trespass-like acts, that a physical intrusion was a trespass-like act, and that
affixing the GPS device to the car was a physical intrusion.”); Brennan-Marquez & Tutt, supra note 30, at
115–16 (“Trespass searches violate the Fourth Amendment even if they infringe on no expectations of
privacy at all.”).
50
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012).
52
Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371. On remand, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina recently concluded
that the state failed to show that the search was reasonable, both with respect to the state’s specific
interest in monitoring Grady and with respect to the efficacy of its offender monitoring program more
generally. State v. Grady, No. COA17-12, 2018 WL 2206344, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. May 15, 2018).
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It is the half-victory that Grady represents that makes this a key constitutional moment
for previously incarcerated sex offender monitoring laws. By announcing that the current forms
of technological monitoring of sex offenders effects a Fourth Amendment search, without
passing judgment on the ultimate constitutional question of reasonableness, the Supreme Court
sowed considerable uncertainty on a civil liberties question of major importance.
B.

“Unreasonable” Searches: Governmental Interests and Citizen Intrusion

For much of the last century, the Supreme Court seemingly embraced what has been
termed the “warrant preference” view of the Fourth Amendment. 53 Although the text of the
Fourth Amendment does not state precisely when a search warrant is required, 54 the Supreme
Court has repeatedly proclaimed that searches conducted without a warrant—or, at the very least,
outside of a judicial process involving prior approval by a judge or a magistrate—are per
se unreasonable, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” 55 This is where scholars well-versed in criminal procedure are likely to chuckle. In
application, the “specifically established and well-delineated” exceptions abound. 56 They can be
found where the government’s interests are substantial, 57 time-bound, 58 or unique; 59 or where the

53

See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of ‘unreasonable searches and
seizures’ is to be read in conjunction with its command that ‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause.’”). See also generally Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133 (2012).
54
See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“What [the text] explicitly states regarding
warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirement of their use.”)); Nikolaus
Williams, Note, The Supreme Court’s Ahistorical Reasonableness Approach to the Fourth Amendment,
89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1522, 1527 (2014) (“The first clause establishes a standard (reasonableness) but does
not explain what it means. The second clause states the requirements for a valid warrant but does not
explain when warrants are required.”).
55
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015).
56
See, e.g., Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth
Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153, 170 (2008) (identifying “some twenty exceptions including
searches incident to arrest, automobile searches, stop and frisk searches, plain view searches, consent
searches, border searches, administrative searches of regulated businesses, exigent circumstances, welfare
searches, inventory searches, airport searches, school searches, searches of mobile homes, and searches of
offices of public employees”).
57
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (exigent circumstances).
58
See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1973) (hot pursuit).
59
See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760–66 (2010) (holding that a warrantless search
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comparative intrusion on privacy is slight, 60 fleeting, 61 or experienced by those who are deemed
to have a reduced expectation of privacy from the outset. 62
Increasingly, the Supreme Court has allowed this view to give up the ghost. In recent
years, the Court has proclaimed that reasonableness is the “ultimate touchstone” of Fourth
Amendment analysis, and it has begun to perform explicitly that comparison of interests that it
had historically engaged in subtextually. 63 Although there are many different formulations of the
reasonableness standard, the constitutionality of a warrantless search ultimately turns on an allthings-considered comparison of the government’s legitimate interests against the intrusiveness
of the search for those subject to it. 64 This is a key development with respect to sex offender
monitoring regimes, which may not fall neatly into established categorical exceptions and yet are
not ordinarily supported by a warrant and probable cause. 65 In fact, in Grady itself, despite the
absence of a warrant, the Supreme Court remanded the case with an explicit directive for the
North Carolina Supreme Court to consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the nature
and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy
expectations.” 66

was reasonable due to the special needs of the workplace environment).
60
See, e.g., Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178 (roadside breathalyzer).
61
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (stop and frisk).
62
See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850–55 (2006) (holding that a warrantless,
suspicionless search of parolee was permissible because of parolee’s diminished expectation of privacy
and government’s substantial interest in supervising parolees).
63
See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).
64
Quon, 560 U.S. at 761 (explaining that searches must be reasonably related to a legitimate interest
and not excessively intrusive in light of the circumstances giving rise to the search).
65
Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent turn toward a general “reasonableness” standard, the most
likely Fourth Amendment doctrinal avenue for assessing the technological monitoring of convicted sex
offenders who are “off paper” (i.e. not on probation or parole) would have been the “special needs”
doctrine, which permits so-called suspicionless “administrative searches” in service of goals other than
law enforcement. See generally Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec.’s Assn., 489 U. S. 602 (1989) (upholding
suspicionless drug testing for railroad workers). The special needs doctrine is a questionable fit given that
at least some of the interests served by sex offender monitoring statutes are the specific deterrence of the
offender and the collection of evidence in the event that deterrence is unsuccessful. Cf. Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000) (noting that the Court is “particularly reluctant” to find special needs
“where governmental authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends”). For the Fourth
Amendment rights of sex offenders on probation or parole, see discussion infra Part IV.B.
66
Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371. Because challenges to sex offender monitoring laws like the one at issue
in Grady are most likely to brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this raises the specter of socalled “double reasonableness”: the substantive constitutional violation requires that the search be
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Although Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a holistic evaluation, we are fortunate to
have a few guideposts. A reasonable warrantless search typically must be tailored to its aims
with roughly the same level of specificity as would be authorized by a valid warrant. 67 The
means by which a search is conducted should therefore be “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 68 It is worth emphasizing the
word “circumstances” and keeping in mind that each instance of monitoring is a distinct and
separate search. In the context of the technological monitoring of convicted sex offenders, this
means that the requisite balance is not merely between the governmental interests that justify a
monitoring program broadly and the extent of the intrusion experienced by an individual
offender. 69 Rather, “as the Court has repeatedly recognized, the means of surveillance, the nature
of the technology at issue, and its potential for abuse must be considered as well.” 70 Various
critical facets of each search, therefore, play a role in the reasonableness determination.
Since Grady was decided in 2015, only one federal circuit court has resolved a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the technological monitoring of sex offenders. The majority opinion in
that case, Belleau v. Wall, 71 exemplifies the strong weight courts are inclined to assign to the
government’s interest in implementing technological monitoring programs against formerly
incarcerated people. Writing for a panel of the Seventh Circuit that unanimously declared the
monitoring program constitutional, Judge Posner emphasized that Wisconsin’s statute worked
“to deter future offenses by making the plaintiff aware that he is being monitored and is likely
therefore to be apprehended should a sex crime be reported at a time, and a location, at which he
is present.” 72 Underscoring the gravity of the need for deterrence, Posner dedicated no less than
unreasonable, while the availability of remedy turns on a separate assessment of the reasonableness of the
violation. See generally Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth
Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 589 (2014).
67
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
68
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (articulating a two-step test to measure
the reasonableness of a search).
69
Of course, the individualized assessment of technological monitoring also carries the potential to
enlarge the government’s interests with respect to certain offenders (e.g., those with demonstrably high
recidivism rates) relative to those interests that justify monitoring at a programmatic level.
70
Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance
Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 177, 182 (2011).
71
Belleau, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016).
72
Id. at 935.
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six well-sourced paragraphs of his opinion to the rampant underreporting of sex crimes and to
the impact that underreporting has on recidivism statistics, seeking to dispel any hint that the
offender in the case might “be thought just a harmless old guy.” 73 As a seemingly final nail in
the coffin, Posner invited “[r]eaders of this opinion who are parents of young children [to] ask
themselves whether they should worry that there are people in their community who have ‘only’
a 16 percent or an 8 percent probability of molesting young children—bearing in mind the
lifelong psychological scars that such molestation frequently inflicts.” 74
Where Judge Posner’s opinion falls short, however, is in assessing the intrusion that
Wisconsin’s technological monitoring statute imposes on offenders. Speaking of the ankle
monitor technology challenged in the case, Posner noted in passing that “such devices are also
used by some parents to keep track of their kids or elderly relatives and by some hikers and
mountain climbers to make sure they know where they are at all times or to track their speed.” 75
Later, he characterized having to wear the monitor as “a bother, an inconvenience, an
annoyance,” but nothing more. 76 He further insisted that, since the plaintiff’s name and address
were already on the public sex offender registry, there was little “additional loss [of privacy]
from the fact that occasionally his trouser leg hitches up and reveals an anklet monitor that may
cause someone who spots it to guess that this is a person who has committed a sex crime.” 77
Displaying an oddly anachronistic understanding of surveillance, Posner juxtaposed a lifetime of
24/7 GPS monitoring, which “just identifies locations,” with “serious” privacy violations, such
as “if the Department of Corrections were following the plaintiff around, peeking through his
bedroom window, trailing him as he walks to the drug store or the local Starbucks, videotaping
73

See id. at 933–34.
Id. We do not comment (here) on whether this representation of the risk sex offenders pose to
communities is accurate. For our purposes, we assume that at least some sex offenders do pose an
elevated risk and therefore there is at least some governmental interest in passing and enforcing postrelease sex offender laws that seek to lower this risk.
75
Id. at 931.
76
Id. at 937.
77
Id. at 935. We are reminded of Justice Douglas’s admonitions in Osborn v. United States:
74

These examples and many others demonstrate an alarming trend whereby the privacy and
dignity of our citizens is being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken
individually, each step may be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, there
begins to emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen—a society in which
government may intrude into the secret regions of man’s life at will.
385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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his every move, and through such snooping learning . . . ‘whether he is a weekly church goer, a
heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband,’ etc.” 78
That Judge Posner seemed dismissive of the privacy intrusions experienced by a sex
offender—one whom he repeatedly labeled as “pedophile,” as if to remind the reader of his
diminished worth—is hardly surprising. Convicted sex offenders are rarely sympathetic, and
tend to arouse anger and disgust in the public. 79 However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
admonished that even the most pressing governmental interests cannot act as a license for
indiscriminate police behavior. 80 As the remainder of this Essay demonstrates, the imposition of
technological monitoring on sex offenders is no small matter. And, as the wide state-to-state
variation in such programs evidences, monitoring is also malleable—it can be implemented in
ways that are more or less intrusive and in ways that are more or less tailored to accomplish the
government’s goals. 81 It is thus an open and evolving question whether and how technological
monitoring can be implemented “reasonably,” consistent with the security that the Fourth
Amendment guarantees to all citizens, regardless of their past crimes.
III.

The Dimensions of Intrusion
Notwithstanding the arguably substantial governmental interests at stake in monitoring

convicted sex offenders, technological monitoring imposes real and substantial burdens on the
individuals subject to it. Proper constitutional analysis requires taking those intrusions
seriously. 82 As the Supreme Court has stated, “The gravity of the threat alone cannot be
dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement may employ to pursue a given
purpose.” 83 The sections that follow each offer a sketch of the theoretical, doctrinal, and practical

78

Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935.
Prescott, supra note 23, at 1041.
80
See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013).
81
We note that the Supreme Court has at times proven unsympathetic to arguments focused on
comparing a challenged search program to less-invasive alternatives. See, e.g., United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 n.12 (1976) (“The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments
could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.”). We direct the
reader to the use of the word “elaborate,” however, which would seem to exclude obvious, costless ways
to reduce intrusiveness.
82
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”).
83
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 32–33 (2000).
79
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arguments that might be advanced with respect to assessing the intrusiveness of technological
monitoring as a Fourth Amendment “search.” Without purporting to be an exhaustive survey,
these sections underscore the variety of dimensions along which offender monitoring programs
may potentially be intrusive and which have proven doctrinal relevance under the Fourth
Amendment. In practice, measuring the intrusiveness of a search will of course be a heavily factbound inquiry, likely turning on the precise technology used, the amount and nature of
information collected, and the specifics of the statute that authorizes the practice. Many of these
features, however, can be individualized, tailoring surveillance to offender circumstances, and
often entail technologically feasible (although not costless) adjustments that can reduce the
burdens of monitoring. By identifying these distinct dimensions of intrusion, our aim is to
elucidate the many (and sometimes countervailing) considerations that should inform how the
government can conduct technological monitoring in ways that are consistent with Fourth
Amendment expectations. 84
A.

Extending the Trespass Test: Physical Invasions

Potentially the most interesting question following Grady is also the most unsettled: How
heavily does the physical intrusion imposed by a given sex offender monitoring technology
weigh in the assessment of whether a search is reasonable? For nearly a half-century, the
privacy-centric focus of Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence largely reduced the question of
intrusiveness to one of data flows. 85 As a result, case law assessing the intrusiveness of the
government’s physical invasions under the Fourth Amendment is rare. 86 Further, it is possible
84

In deploying this method, we see our Essay as complementary to the work of notable Fourth
Amendment scholars who have isolated and clarified separate strains of jurisprudence that too often fall
under a single label. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757 (1994); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007);
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
85
For a criticism of this state of affairs, see generally David A. Sklansky, Too Much Information:
How Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069 (2014).
86
One such rare exception are Section 1983 civil rights suits claiming that government agents used
excessive force (typically when conducting a seizure). See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95
(1989) (holding that such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, rather than
substantive due process). However, those cases have limited analogical value for evaluating the
technological monitoring of sex offenders. They commonly involve the snap judgments of police in the
field, rather than programmatic decisions, are bound up with complicated questions of qualified
immunity, and primarily surface in the most extreme fact patterns, such as those involving the death of a
criminal suspect. See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 310–11 (2015); Anderson v. Creighton, 483
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that the trespass test articulated in Jones will eventually prove to be relevant primarily (or
perhaps even exclusively) to the threshold inquiry of whether a search occurred, rather than to an
assessment of that search’s reasonableness. We note, for example, that the Grady Court itself
returned to the language of “reasonable privacy expectations” when it instructed the North
Carolina courts to assess the intrusiveness of sex offender monitoring. 87
We doubt that the Jones trespass test can be so cabined, however. The majority opinion
in Jones turns almost exclusively on the (relatively minor) physical invasion involved in
surreptitiously attaching an inconspicuous GPS device to the underside of a vehicle. It was this
physical invasion that allowed the Jones Court to distinguish two prior precedents in which the
Court found that the government’s use of technological monitoring to collect similar information
did not invade defendants’ privacy. 88 Jones is thus best read as supporting the commonsense
proposition that the means of a search matter to whether the search is constitutional 89: A physical
invasion by the government to collect information is a constitutionally significant event,
irrespective of the nature of the information it succeeds in collecting.
One useful analog for understanding the weight of physical intrusion in Fourth
Amendment analysis came just one year after Grady, when the Supreme Court evaluated the
reasonableness of two different methods for evaluating the blood-alcohol content of suspected
drunk drivers. 90 The Court concluded that a warrantless “breathalyzer” search is reasonable in
part because “the physical intrusion is almost negligible.” 91 Analogizing the test to drinking out

U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
87
Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015).
88
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (reasoning that the prior “beeper” cases did not
involve a trespass because the device was installed in the relevant containers prior to the defendant taking
possession). See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S 276
(1983). To be clear, the Karo Court held that the government’s monitoring of the beeper did constitute a
Fourth Amendment search once it revealed non-public information about the suspect’s residence, but not
when revealing publicly available information—information such as the location of a vehicle on public
roads or the location of a container in an open field. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
89
Illustrative of the distinction that Justice Scalia was drawing, prior cases were akin to a suspect
inviting a wired-up informant into his business (a situation that the Supreme Court has repeatedly found
not to be a search), whereas the physical intrusion in Jones more closely parallels the surreptitious
instillation of a microphone into the wall. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 410 (citing On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747, 751–52 (1952)). See also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (holding that a
Fourth Amendment “search” occurred when the government inserted a microphone into a suspect’s wall).
90
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
91
Id. at 2176.
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of a straw or blowing up a party balloon, the Court concluded that the search required “nothing
painful or strange” of the suspect. 92 The Court, however, struck down compulsory blood tests
largely because of the extent of the physical invasion involved, describing the tests as requiring
the piercing of the skin to “extract a part of the subject’s body.” 93 The Court further explained
that the blood test’s reasonableness “must be judged in light of the availability of the less
invasive alternative of a breath test.” 94
Taking a stab at a preliminary framework, we might think of physical intrusion as
existing on a spectrum. At one end of this spectrum are “strange or painful” technologies.
Although individuals might disagree over the comparative levels of intrusion of specific devices,
this end of the spectrum likely includes technologies that require surgical implantation, those that
physically implicate portions of the body, and those that cause substantial or long-lasting or
chronic pain. At the opposite end of this spectrum would be the least invasive technologies, those
akin to simply breathing into a breathalyzer. For example, one can imagine a hypothetical
program for sex offender monitoring that requires merely the downloading of a smart phone app
and the periodic logging of location through biometric identification on the phone, perhaps by
fingerprint or facial recognition technology that is already nearly ubiquitous in American society.
Assuming that the trespass rationale of Jones and Grady would extend to the app’s “intrusion”
on the smartphone—its occupation of the owner’s electronic circuits, stored energy, and
memory 95—the comparative physical intrusion experienced by the offender would be rather

92

Id. at 2177. The Supreme Court has likewise upheld the constitutionality of investigative practices
like cheek swabs and fingernail scrapings involving only “negligible” or “very limited” physical
intrusions. See King, 569 U.S. at 446–47; Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973).
93
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178. The Supreme Court has elsewhere described “compelled surgical
intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence” as implicating “expectations of privacy and security of
such magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”
See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the state
from surgically extracting a bullet from a criminal suspect in order to collect evidence).
94
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.
95
In his Jones concurrence, Justice Alito anticipated that a trespass test “will present particularly
vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, as opposed to
physical, contact with the item to be tracked.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 426 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (offering the example of police surreptitiously activing a car’s stolen vehicle detection
system). Moreover, in 2016, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals published a decision in which (then
Circuit Judge, now Supreme Court Justice) Neil Gorsuch held that the government conducted a
trespassory Jones search without a physical invasion when it opened the defendant’s emails via a remote
web browser. See United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
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minimal. From this basic framework, we can then add nuance. For example, haptic feedback
technologies that use vibration or other forms of physical or auditory force to notify an offender
of potential violations would likely add to the experienced intrusiveness, even if the device was
otherwise physically unimposing, 96 in the same way we can imagine a breathalyzer that is
designed in a way to be painful or strange to use.
Currently available monitoring technology sits somewhere in the middle of this
continuum. First-hand accounts from Michigan sex offenders subject to lifetime monitoring
reveal the substantial physical burden technological monitoring devices can impose. The device
used for lifetime monitoring in Michigan at the time was even larger than a traditional GPS ankle
monitor. 97 The weight of the device could rub the underlying skin raw or cut into the skin and
cause bleeding. 98 The device is designed to vibrate for particular alerts, and can also cause
electric shocks when it malfunctions. 99 Technological monitoring can also be physically
incapacitating: the technology used in Michigan required the offender to remain plugged into a
wall outlet for at least two hours each day to allow the device to charge. 100 Charging cannot
realistically be performed while sleeping because movement will disconnect the charger,
triggering a vibration that further disrupts sleep. 101 Individuals subjected to devices of this sort
appear to view them as similar to a classic ball and chain, which might have weighed only 18
pounds, 102 and yet was nevertheless exasperating (and historically and socially salient) precisely
because its wearer could never be free of it. 103 There was no lull in the intrusion.

96

Amazon recently made headlines when it patented worker monitoring wristbands that could alert a
worker to possible mistakes or deviations in a similar manner. See Ceylan Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off,
the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html.
97
Brief for the ACLU of Mich. and the Crim. Def. Atty’s of Mich. as Amici Curiae, People v. Cole,
817 N.W.2d 497(Mich. 2012) (No. 143046), 2012 WL 697464, at *App’x.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Found: The Ball and Chain That May Have Condemned a 17th Century Prisoner to a Watery
Grave in the Thames, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 27, 2009, 10:28 AM), http://www.dailymail.co. uk/news/article1209405/First-intact-ball-chain-drowned-prisoner-mud-Thames.html.
103
Cf. Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 194–99
(2000) (discussing various ways in which burdens imposed by sex offender registration and community
notification laws result in a “hidden” custody sufficient to warrant federal habeas corpus protection).
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Against this backdrop, Judge Posner’s casual equating of offender monitoring technology
with the GPS devices used to track “hikers,” “kids,” or “elderly relatives” is inaccurate and
seems disingenuous. 104 As Birchfield demonstrates, one measure of the intrusiveness of a given
technology is the availability of a less invasive alternative. 105 Yet thus far the devices used to
track sex offenders are substantially more onerous than consumer versions of GPS technology. 106
Consider that in the span of just a few years, GPS monitoring technologies have not only
advanced in technological sophistication, but have been dramatically reduced in their physical
dimensions. 107 A modern-day GPS chip is approximately the size of a postage stamp; a similar
device from a decade earlier would have been more comparable to a thick stack of index
cards. 108 In addition to being smaller and lighter, current monitoring devices are often styled in
ways that mimic traditional fashion accessories—such as bracelets and wristwatches—and are
therefore simply less “strange” than the sizable ankle devices often used for offenders, which are
echoes of historical prisoner restraints, such as shackles and leg irons. 109
This comparison suggests a lasting significance for Jones in non-investigative contexts.
Some commentators have questioned the utility of a Fourth Amendment trespass test, given that
the need of law enforcement to reduce inconvenience and the risk of detection provides a strong
incentive for the government to continue developing and using less physically intrusive

104

See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178, 2184 (2016).
106
Some monitoring regimes require released sex offenders to pay for their own monitors. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.285(2) (West 2006); Lifetime Electronic Monitoring Program—Current Daily
Rate, MICH. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIONS (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/
Current_Daily_Rate_for_Lifetime_Electronic_Monitoring_Program_353451_7.pdf. Although the
practice of making criminal offenders pay for their punishment is not uncommon, see Cook, supra note 3,
having released sex offenders pay for the government to search them may be relevant to the extent of the
Fourth Amendment intrusion.
107
See Jordan Miller, New Age Tracking Technologies in the Post-United States v. Jones
Environment: The Need for Model Legislation, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV. 553, 560–65 (2015).
108
See id. at 563–64.
109
Although shackles and leg irons are not “strange” in at least one sense—they have a long history
of use—the Birchfield Court’s reference to “painful or strange” physical intrusions operates by comparing
the challenged intrusion to the everyday activities of ordinary citizens. A breath test is minimally intrusive
when it is analogous to drinking out of a straw. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177. A blood test is significantly
more intrusive when it is analogous to a blood draw during an annual physical exam, a process that few
relish and some try to avoid. Id. at 2178. Shackles and leg irons lack a clear analog in everyday life, and
are therefore an indisputably “strange” form of physical intrusion for most citizens.
105
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monitoring technologies. 110 Indeed, the pervasive use of consumer technology that performs
similar types of monitoring—from cellular phones to vehicle navigation systems to personal
fitness trackers—may provide the government with avenues for surveillance that render physical
intrusion entirely unnecessary. 111 For these reasons, we might correctly anticipate that the
number of successful Jones challenges to investigative searches will be both small and
decreasing in the face of technological advancements. However, the same logic suggests that
Jones may ultimately have a lasting and substantial role to play in the post-release monitoring
context, in which the government lacks the same inherent incentives—primarily, fear of
detection and evasion—to develop and employ less physically intrusive technologies. In fact, in
these situations, individual government actors may have colorable reasons for imposing a greater
level of physical intrusion than necessary—a cost borne solely by the citizen being monitored—
in service of seemingly sensible goals, such as the financial savings (or simply the ease) of
delaying upgrades to outdated technology. 112 A Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that bars
unreasonable physical intrusions, forcing the government to be thoughtful and careful in how it
buys and deploys monitoring technology, can change the landscape.
B.

Too Much Information: A “Mosaic” Theory of Intrusion

In addition to intruding on individuals physically, the technological monitoring of
convicted sex offenders intrudes on those individuals’ privacy because it collects large quantities
of information. Although Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jones emphasized the physical
trespass involved, five members of the Jones Court also expressed concerns that extended
monitoring would amount to a Fourth Amendment search even under the Katz test. Justice
Sotomayor joined Scalia’s majority opinion, relying on trespass, but also wrote separately to
offer her view that technological advances may uniquely threaten citizen privacy by allowing a
depth of surveillance not previously possible at a fraction of the cost of traditional methods. 113

110

Miller, supra note 107, at 563.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414–15 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
112
Moreover, government actors may view themselves as having an affirmative incentive to increase
the physical burden of a monitoring technology as a punitive measure.
113
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415–16 (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations. . . . And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to
conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary
111
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She expressed not only doubt that “people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on,” but also unease at the
government’s wielding “a tool so amenable to misuse.” 114 Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by
three other Justices, likewise emphasized the intrusiveness of extended technological
surveillance. 115 Calling the four-week continuous tracking of the suspect’s vehicle “lengthy,”
Alito reasoned that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every
single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” 116
At the core of these Justices’ concerns is what has come to be known as the “mosaic
theory” of Fourth Amendment privacy—“the idea that certain types of governmental
investigation enable accumulation of so many individual bits about a person’s life that the
resulting personality picture is worthy of constitutional protection.” 117 Here is how the D.C.
Circuit first articulated the mosaic theory in United States v. Maynard, which became Jones
before the Supreme Court:
[The] whole reveals far more than the individual movements it comprises. The
difference is not one of degree but of kind, for no single journey reveals the habits
and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life,
nor the departure from a routine that, like the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock
Holmes story, may reveal even more. 118
Scholars and commentators have addressed at length the utility and practicability of adopting the
mosaic theory. 119 We do not intend to revisit that ground. Rather, we are particularly interested
in considering what weight, if any, concerns about the intrusiveness of data aggregation have in
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community
hostility.’” (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)).
114
Jones, 565 U.S. at 416.
115
See id. at 418–19 (Alito, J. concurring). Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined Alito’s
concurrence.
116
Id. at 430.
117
Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A
Statutory Implementation of the Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3–4 (2012).
118
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012).
119
For a thorough overview of the origins of the mosaic theory, see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory
of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).

21
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/187
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198319

22

McJunkin and Prescott:

analyzing whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable. The mosaic theory is traditionally
thought to be mostly relevant to the predicate question whether a Fourth Amendment search has
occurred. 120 However, the particular concerns about the intrusiveness of monitoring that drive
the mosaic theory in the first instance also seem apropos to resolving the further question
whether a specific search was constitutionally reasonable.
Consider again Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones. She identified several “unique
attributes of GPS surveillance” that require careful attention. 121 First, the monitoring is “precise”
and “comprehensive.” 122 Second, the government can store the records generated by monitoring
technologies “and efficiently mine them for information years into the future.” 123 Taken together,
she fears that these two features result in monitoring that “chills associational and expressive
freedoms.” 124 Third, the technology is (relatively) inexpensive, allowing the government to
conduct searches unconstrained by the resource limitations that might have previously curtailed
abusive practices. 125 All three concerns quite clearly extend to the technological monitoring of
convicted sex offenders. The first two of Sotomayor’s concerns echo the work of legal scholars
who claim that excessive surveillance can have a crippling effect on individuals. 126 For example,
120

See id., at 312–13. As noted above, the Jones Court did not evaluate the reasonableness of
extended technological monitoring, despite five members of the Court endorsing something akin to the
mosaic theory. Jones, 565 U.S. at 413 (“We consider the argument [that the search was reasonable]
forfeited.”). See also id. at 416–17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the intrusiveness of GPS
monitoring is relevant to “the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s
public movements,” but declining to resolve that question); id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring)
(explaining that “the lengthy monitoring that occurred in this case constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment” without analyzing whether the search was reasonable).
121
Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
122
Id.
123
Id. Notably, the Supreme Court quietly expressed a similar concern about the storage and future
use of collected data in Birchfield, the breathalyzer and blood test case from the same Term as Jones. See
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (noting that blood samples can be preserved for
some length of time and can reveal information beyond blood-alcohol content, thus generating anxiety
about unanticipated future uses for those subjected to a blood draw). See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez
& Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Anxiety, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2018).
124
Jones, 565 U.S. at 416.
125
Id. at 415–16.
126
See Sklansky, supra note 85, at 1095–97 (surveying the scholarship arguing for what he terms the
“stultification thesis”—“the belief that surveillance deters the kinds of activities and communications
necessary for people to lead full lives as individuals and democratic citizens”). See generally MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 202–03 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (“He who is subjected to
a field of visibility, who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relations in which he simultaneously
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Jed Rubenfeld has argued that the Fourth Amendment principally exists to protect an
individual’s personal life, which he conceptualizes as a space “where people are supposed to be
free from the strictures of public norms, free to be their own men and women, free to say what
they actually think, and to act on their actual desires or principles, even if doing so defies public
norms.” 127 The third concern reflects the longstanding fear that widespread surveillance will be
destructive of the relationship between citizens and the government. 128 Although this idea has
never been given a special doctrinal formulation, courts and commentators have long posited that
the Fourth Amendment serves as a check against “a too permeating police surveillance.” 129
Wisconsin’s technological monitoring program, at issue in Belleau, entailed several
programmatic decisions that arguably mitigate the set of concerns addressed by the mosaic
theory. With respect to the concern over increased police surveillance power due to reduced
surveillance costs, Judge Flaum in a concurring opinion explained that Wisconsin’s monitoring
program had, as a matter of course, relatively little police involvement:
Police do not administer the program, or even access the GPS data unless they
have some reason to specifically request it. Even the Department of Corrections
does not review Belleau’s location in real-time, but only at the end of each day.
Additionally, the program is narrowly designed only to track Belleau’s
location. 130
The use of third parties (including private parties) to perform governmental tracking is actually
quite common. 131 An important question, however, is whether the use of third parties has privacy
benefits that might minimize the intrusiveness of a government search. On the one hand, the
raging debate over the much-maligned third-party doctrine demonstrates that people are
particularly uncomfortable providing the government with access to information that they freely,
if often unknowingly, provide to private companies. 132 On the other hand, and perhaps relatedly,

plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.”).
127
Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 128 (2008).
128
See generally Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1104–07 (2002) (articulating the dangers of governmental information
gathering).
129
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
130
Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 941 (7th Cir. 2016) (Flaum, J., concurring).
131
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Feliz, No. 16-00077, 2017 WL 1450461, at *2 (Mass. Super. Apr. 21,
2017) (describing Massachusetts’s partnership with 3M).
132
See Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under Justice Stevens’s Fourth Amendment? 74
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the dangers of surveillance are increasingly understood to be a function of the interaction of both
public- and private-sector information collection. 133 Although the Wisconsin program ultimately
put sex offender monitoring data in the hands of its Department of Corrections in the first
instance, rather than its police, it does not erect any barriers to police accessing that data, other
than the effort of making the request. Moreover, by disseminating the information to a larger
number of parties, greater exposure occurs—to more people in more roles. For the same reason,
a monitoring program such as Wisconsin’s increases the risk of data leakage and various other
privacy harms—including blackmail, coercion, and discrimination. 134
A more promising feature of the Wisconsin program, at least from a privacy perspective,
is the lack of active monitoring. Judge Posner emphasized this fact in his Belleau opinion,
juxtaposing problematic governmental surveillance techniques—“following the plaintiff around .
. . trailing him as he walks to the drug store or the local Starbucks”—with the nightly mapping
conducted by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections:
[E]very night the Department of Corrections makes a map of every anklet
wearer’s whereabouts that day so that should he be present at a place where a sex
crime has been committed, or be hanging around school playgrounds or otherwise
showing an abnormal interest in children not his own, the police will be alerted to
the need to conduct an investigation. 135
In his concurrence, Judge Flaum described this as a lack of “real-time” monitoring, a
characterization sometimes used by courts. 136 But we think that few of the privacy implications
of active versus passive monitoring turn solely on when the monitoring is conducted. 137 Rather,

FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1745 (2006).
133
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1958 (2013).
134
Id. at 1952–58.
135
Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935.
136
A handful of courts have intimated that the constitutionality of cell phone location tracking may
depend on whether the information collected is “historical” rather than “real time.” See, e.g., Tracey v.
State, 152 So. 3d 504, 512–19 (Fla. 2014) (surveying federal law). But see Orin Kerr, “Florida Supreme
Court Holds Real-Time Cell-Site Data Protected under Fourth Amendment,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct.
16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/16/florida-supremecourt-holds-real-time-cell-site-data-protected-under-fourth-amendment (“That distinction matters in the
statutory context because the Stored Communications Act expressly regulates historical access but does
not regulate real-time access. But I don’t see how it could matter for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
question of what is a ‘search.’”).
137
The idea of persistent, real-time observation may feel inherently intrusive in the abstract. But one
can easily construct hypotheticals involving transmission delays of seconds, minutes, or even hours that
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the crux of the concern about real-time monitoring appears to be that it draws the government’s
attention to large quantities of information that are irrelevant to the ultimate aim of deterring
future crime. As Posner alluded to in his opinion, real-time, active monitoring requires that equal
attention is paid to a convicted sex offender’s trip to Starbucks and his trip to a local school or
playground. 138 Passive monitoring technologies, which alert law enforcement only when the
information collected suggests a problem (potentially after some processing delay, as in
Wisconsin’s daily mapping regime), are thus less intrusive in the sense that they are able to
distinguish relevant from irrelevant information. 139
Being able to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information speaks directly to Justice
Sotomayor’s first two concerns—the propensity of comprehensive surveillance to produce
chilling effects on associational and expressive freedoms. 140 Knowing that the government is
watching may dissuade monitored offenders from acting on their authentic preferences, even
with respect to activities that have nothing to do with the likelihood of recidivism. Traditionally,
the Fourth Amendment has protected against “dragnet” searches and “fishing expeditions” by
requiring particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing as a predicate to a search. 141
“Particularized suspicion keeps the government’s profound investigative powers in check
preventing widespread surveillance and snooping into the lives and affairs of all citizens.” 142 In
the context of sex offender monitoring, passive monitoring technologies may function as a
quickly undermine the instinct that timing, as opposed to the nature and quantity of information collected,
is the source of the intrusion.
138
Belleau, 811 F.3d at 935.
139
Real-time monitoring by a human does dangle the possibility of additional law enforcement
benefits, however: the intervention and prevention or disruption of a crime as it is about to occur or is
occurring (perhaps in an unexpected way that any passive monitoring technology is less likely to detect).
Passive monitoring as deployed seems to build in a delay in law enforcement responsiveness and
necessarily operates on the basis of backward-looking offender behavioral patterns. As technology
improves, alert systems relying on advanced prediction technology may reduce or eliminate or even
reverse any advantage of a human being monitoring a sex offender in real time.
140
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
141
See Solove, supra note 128, at 1107. One of the paradigmatic evils that the Fourth Amendment
was enacted to restrain is the “indiscriminate rummaging” permitted by general warrants. See Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion).
142
Solove, supra note 128, at 1109. Scholars concerned about the growing state of governmental
surveillance frequently tout similar benefits from Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA). See Richards, supra note 133, at 1962. The ECPA requires that warrants for wiretaps be
for a limited time and that the wiretapping be “conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
information not relevant to the warrant.” Id. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22.
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surrogate for a suspicion requirement, and thus better comport with the animating principles of
the Fourth Amendment, either by reducing the salience of irrelevant information or by keeping it
from the authorities altogether. 143
On this score, Wisconsin’s daily mapping regimen likely occupies a middle ground in its
intrusiveness. All of the locations of a monitored individual in a given day are ultimately
observed by the Department of Corrections. But the aggregation of an entire day’s worth of
movements may minimize the attention paid to any particular movement, particularly if the
government is sincere in its assertion that the daily maps are used only to evaluate whether the
offender engaged in any conduct that warrants further investigation by the police. 144 Other, even
less intrusive programs are certainly possible. Massachusetts, for example, collects and preserves
location data, but does not typically review the data unless an automated alert has been triggered
by an event such as a monitored individual entering an exclusion zone. 145
C.

“Intimacy” and Intrusion: Preserving Privacy at Home

While the informational privacy analysis set forth above emphasizes the quantity of
information the government collects, and who (and how often they) can view it, the Fourth
Amendment also imposes strict limitations on the kind of information that may be collected
through the technological monitoring of convicted sex offenders. The Fourth Amendment has
long afforded special protection to information and locations associated with traditionally
“intimate” behavior, the home chief among them. 146 Houses are expressly included in the text of
143

We note, however, that passive monitoring programs typically involve the storage of monitoring
data for some period of time. The preservation of such data raises the specter of future mining and use by
the government, which may be of constitutional significance. See supra note 123.
144
Judge Posner suggested a rather tenuous distinction between a device that “just identifies
locations” and one with the capability to “reveal what the wearer of the device is doing at any of the
locations.” See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 2016). Obviously, one’s conduct can be
inferred with some level of accuracy from one’s movements, even if such inferences are at times off the
mark. We are more persuaded that Department of Corrections employees will be disinclined to spend the
time and mental effort necessary to draw such inferences in the first place when they are tasked with
mapping aggregated information in search of specific, suspicious movements.
145
See Commonwealth v. Feliz, No. 16-00077, 2017 WL 1450461, at *2 (Mass. Super. Apr. 21,
2017).
146
See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide the
setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference . . . .”); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .”).

26
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198319

27

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 187 [2018]

the Fourth Amendment as an embodiment of the centuries-old respect afforded the sanctity and
privacy of the home. 147 At times, the Supreme Court has implied that the Fourth Amendment
draws a clear line at the entrance to the home, including in one of the earliest cases on
technological monitoring. 148 The Court has also suggested more often of late that the
constitutional protection of the home serves to prophylactically protect the personal intimacies
that typically take place within that sphere. 149
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the intimacies
of the home can be seen in Kyllo v. United States. 150 There, the Supreme Court confronted the
government’s use of technology to detect heat signatures emanating from the exterior of a
home. 151 Tellingly, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion framed the constitutional inquiry as “what
limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.” 152 The
Court expressed skepticism about the government’s use of “a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion.” 153 Although the technology in question was deployed to confirm the
suspected cultivation of marijuana, the Kyllo Court feared it might equally be used to “disclose,
for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.” 154
Despite offering this particularly evocative (if problematic) 155 depiction of an “intimacy” that the
147

See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 591–98 (1980) (proclaiming that “the Fourth
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house” and surveying English common law
regarding warrantless entries into the home).
148
E.g., id.; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–18 (1984) (holding that a warrant was required
to monitor the signal of an electronic beeper once it entered a private home).
149
During oral argument in Carpenter v. United States, a case that will decide the Fourth Amendment
status of cell phone location data, Justice Sotomayor drew laughs with her insight that the location data is
emanating from a device that many now use on the toilet and carry with them to bed. See Carpenter v.
United States, No. 16-402, transcript pp. 42-43 (Nov. 29, 2017), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-402_3f14.pdf.
150
Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
151
Id. at 29.
152
Id. at 34.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 38.
155
See Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L. J. 485, 488–89 (2009) (highlighting the
“anachronism” of this imagery, which posits privacy as “a woman, the object of the male gaze.”). See
generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE & LAW 101 (1983) (“From this perspective, the legal concept of
privacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and women’s exploited labor; has
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Fourth Amendment shields from exposure, the Court explained that the outcome does not depend
on the specific information actually revealed by the search: “In the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” 156
Kyllo is thus paradigmatic of a broad trend in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to protect from
governmental intrusion the stereotypical American home.
One helpful approach to thinking about the Fourth Amendment’s traditional privileging
of the home has been offered by Kerr’s “equilibrium-adjustment theory” of the Fourth
Amendment, which contends that judges respond to new technologies and social practices by
adjusting the Fourth Amendment’s protections so as to restore a historical balance between the
needs of law enforcement and individual liberty. 157 “When new tools and new practices threaten
to expand or contract police power in a significant way, courts adjust the level of Fourth
Amendment protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium.” 158 Whether or not the judicial
responses that Kerr identifies are intentional efforts to restore a balance, an equilibriumadjustment theory of the Fourth Amendment has considerable explanatory power. The Supreme
Court, in particular, has frequently analogized modern-day governmental searches to historical
Anglo-American legal practices in order to evaluate their permissibility.
On an equilibrium-adjustment theory, we should expect that technological monitoring of
sex offenders would be on its most tenuous constitutional footing when it captures information
within the home. As far back as the dawn of the seventeenth century, an English court famously
observed that “the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence
against injury and violence, as for his repose.” 159 William Blackstone reiterated that sentiment in
his Commentaries on the Laws of England, noting that “the law of England has so particular and
tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer
it to be violated with impunity: . . . . For this reason no doors can in general be broken open to

preserved the central institutions whereby women are deprived of identity, autonomy, control and selfdefinition; and has protected the primary activity through which male supremacy is expressed and
enforced.”).
156
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
157
See Kerr, supra note 41, at 517–18.
158
Id. at 480.
159
Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603). For a brief critique of the wisdom of
extending the historical castle metaphor to contemporary legal systems, see Ben A. McJunkin, Rank
Among Equals, 113 MICH. L. REV. 855, 870 (2015).
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execute any civil process; though, in criminal causes, the public safety supersedes the private.” 160
Politicians, courts, and commentators ensured that this principle became part of the fabric of
early American law. As Thomas Cooley observed in his famous 1868 constitutional law treatise,
“it is better oftentimes that crime should go unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to
have his premises invaded, his trunks broken open, his private books, papers, and letters exposed
to prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions of ignorant and suspicious persons.” 161 And,
indeed, the Supreme Court has routinely struck down the government’s use of modern
technology to collect information about the interior of a citizen’s home. 162
The technological monitoring of sex offenders thus poses a unique Fourth Amendment
dilemma. One would expect that a careful Fourth Amendment analysis of technological
monitoring would recognize that the nature of information collected informs whether a search is
reasonable by taking into account whether the information in question is especially intimate and
whether it has any realistic connection to monitoring’s legitimate goals (i.e., recidivism
reduction). Modern GPS technology has the ability to pinpoint a user’s location to within about
three meters (roughly ten feet). 163 That level of accuracy is useful for effectively monitoring
individuals’ movements outside of the home. Yet it is also quite possibly sufficient to locate an
individual within a specific room of a home. It is easy to imagine that future monitoring
technologies will be able to generate location information that is even more precise and perhaps
makes available other details as well, such as a person’s directional orientation, whether the
person is standing or sitting or lying down (i.e., using altitude measurements and gyroscope
technology), etc. We may soon reach a point where the government has the power not only to
identify when the (monitored) lady of the house takes her daily bath, but also to distinguish a trip
to the bath from a trip to the toilet. This would be an unprecedented level of intrusion for the
Fourth Amendment to countenance without a warrant or an exception to it.
In addition, the nature of technological monitoring seems very likely to continue to
evolve beyond simple geolocation and physical orientation tracking. Although monitoring
160

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 223 (1765–1769).
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 306 (1868).
162
E.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37; Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–18.
163
Tim Kolesk, Note, At the Intersection of Fourth and Sixth: GPS Evidence and the Constitutional
Rights of Criminal Defendants, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1302 (2017).
161

29
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/187
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198319

30

McJunkin and Prescott:

devices that generate audio or video recordings within the home would likely be considered so
invasive as to be presumptively unreasonable, currently available consumer technology hints at
other avenues of possible intrusion into traditionally protected intimacies. 164 Imagine, for
example, a technological monitoring program that outfitted convicted sex offenders with
heartrate or blood pressure monitors to detect patterns that might indicate heightened sexual
arousal (and hence a potential opportunity for recidivism). We might view such an intrusion as
beyond the pale, even where the information gained by monitoring has some meaningful benefit
to the government’s aims. 165 Intrusions in this category are almost instinctively offputting, and
may be less amenable to trade-offs than those in other categories.
These observations suggest that the government’s use of monitoring technology may
need to be tailored to preserve the sanctity of intimate information within the home. Fortunately,
there is no obvious reason why technology that has additional monitoring capacity cannot also be
fitted with checks to allow extreme monitoring only when particularly justified, with protections
against intrusions in place whenever an individual is at home. As it continues to develop,
monitoring technology will become better able to collect much more information, allowing
greater depth and focus, but also will become better able to algorithmically “unfocus” when the
information to hand is intimate or irrelevant. But, importantly, technology producers may require
encouragement by courts or legislatures to develop ways to limit the reach of their own products,
since those who buy and deploy monitoring technology are unlikely to worry too much about
overinclusive data collection—after all, extra, unnecessary data can always be ignored—absent
some pressure from government actors.
D.

Search as Spectacle: Dignitary Harms and the Fourth Amendment

A fourth, and final, dimension of intrusion relates to the visibility of technological
monitoring. To individuals being monitored, the visibility of the technology to the public is one
of the most tangible and salient burdens that a governmental monitoring regime imposes.
Wearable technology—such as a traditional ankle monitor—immediately brands the wearer as a
164

One concern here is that courts may prove less willing to give normative privilege to the
intimacies of sex offenders who have demonstrated their divergence from accepted social norms.
165
Indeed, the level of intrusion seems to magnify if we imagine future technologies that allow the
monitoring to be more precise—e.g., monitoring for specific muscle contractions, blood flow to specific
body parts, or pupil dilation.
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criminal or other undesirable, inviting stigma, ostracism, and even confrontation. 166 Fourth
Amendment search jurisprudence, however, has historically had little to say about social stigma.
Judges frequently dispatch such arguments summarily, as if they are minor grievances of no
doctrinal significance. 167 Meanwhile, scholarly consideration of the spectacle of search remains
rare, often classified as an outsider critique. 168 Nevertheless, we view search stigma as a critical
consideration because many of the values that the Fourth Amendment aims to protect are
threatened or impinged by search practices that publicize past criminality and ongoing suspicion.
Consider, for example, the disfavored constitutional status of “media ride-alongs.” Early
one morning in 1992, a team of U.S. Marshals and Maryland police officers attempted to execute
arrest warrants for a known fugitive by entering the residence listed as his address. 169 Because
the excursion was part of a special national fugitive apprehension program—dubbed “Operation
Gunsmoke”—the marshals had invited a reporter and photographer from the Washington Post to
accompany them. 170 Unknown to the government agents involved, however, they had actually
entered the home of the fugitive’s parents, Charles and Geraldine Wilson. 171 The Post’s
photographer captured the chaos that ensued. Believing him to be their target, officers quickly
subdued an angry, cursing Charles Wilson, dressed only in a pair of briefs. 172 Geraldine Wilson,
dressed in a thin nightgown, looked on. 173 Eventually, the government agents learned that their
true target was not in the home, and they departed; the photographs of the incident were never
published. 174 The Wilsons, however, brought a Section 1983 action seeking monetary damages
for being subjected to an unreasonable search. 175
166

See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at *6, Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 153225) (recounting that “[a] neighbor who learned Belleau was a sex offender brandished a gun and
warned him to stay away, and others stopped speaking with him”).
167
Consider Judge Posner’s minimizing description of the plaintiff’s burden in Belleau: “When the
ankleted person is wearing trousers the anklet is visible only if he sits down and his trousers hike up
several inches and as a result no longer cover it.” Belleau, 811 F.3d at 932.
168
See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 68–69
(2009).
169
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 606–07 (1999).
170
Id.
171
Id. at 606.
172
Id. at 607.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 607–08.
175
Id. at 608.
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The Wilsons’ lawsuit reached the Supreme Court in the fall of 1998. Chief Justice
Rehnquist authored the Court’s opinion, which began by conceding that the government agents
“were undoubtedly entitled to enter the Wilson home in order to execute the arrest warrant.” 176
“But it does not necessarily follow that they were entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a
photographer with them,” Rehnquist added. 177 Doctrinally, the issue before the Court was
whether the media’s presence was so unrelated to the purpose of the search as to render an
otherwise lawful entry into the home unreasonable. 178 And, in fact, the government had
identified several legitimate law enforcement goals that were arguably furthered by the media
ride-along, including the possibility that the presence of reporters might protect suspects and
minimize police abuses, much in the same way that police dash cams and body cams are now
justified. 179 The Court was unanimously unpersuaded. 180 Justice Rehnquist (and the rest of the
Wilson Court) drew a clear distinction between reasonable “quality control” measures, including
potentially police-operated cameras, and the presence of “Washington Post reporters in the
Wilsons’ home . . . working on a story for their own purposes.” 181 This distinction hints at
something deeper than simply the purposelessness of a third party’s presence during a police
search: It was that the purpose was to publicize. It was the specter of spectacle that was so
troubling to the Court. Despite the fact that the Post had published neither a story of the search
nor any of the photographs taken, Rehnquist’s opinion repeatedly framed the analysis in a way
that emphasized the unseemliness of bringing “the media” into a “private home.” 182
Wilson represents but one example of how the Fourth Amendment constrains the methods
police may use to accomplish their objectives. In particular, the case suggests that publicity of
criminality may itself be a cognizable form of privacy invasion. It is far from alone in that
respect. The Supreme Court has at times weighed the “public stigma associated with the search”
in assessing the reasonableness of police conduct. 183 It has intimated that searches may be
176

Id. at 611.
Id.
178
Id.
179
See id. at 611–13.
180
Justice Stevens concurred that the Fourth Amendment was violated, but dissented on the separate
question whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
181
Id. at 613.
182
See id. at 605, 608, 613–15.
183
See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (reasoning that detention of a person in
177
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especially intrusive when they connote criminality, serving as a “badge of shame.” 184 Lower
federal courts have repeatedly considered whether an otherwise lawful search or seizure was
rendered unreasonable by subjecting a suspect to the “stigma” and “indignity” of remaining
unclothed for a prolonged period. 185 Scholars have taken these privacy-based concerns about
publicizing criminality even further. Bill Stuntz once wrote about the “invasions of dignitary
interests” that accompany many constitutional policing practices when they occur in public:
“Arrests or street stops infringe privacy in this sense because they stigmatize the individual,
single him out, and deprive him of freedom.” 186 More recently, numerous scholars have
demonstrated the slew of ways that the public stigma associated with subjection to basic policing
tactics, such as the classic Terry stop, reinforce harmful social models of race and gender. 187
Similar arguments have been marshalled to support Fourth Amendment challenges to the
stigmatizing practices ranging from drug-dog sniffs 188 to “perp walks.” 189

a private residence “would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a
compelled visit to the police station”).
184
Veronia Sch. Dist. 47 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).
185
See, e.g., Hutchinson v. W. Va. State Police, 731 F. Supp. 2d 521, 537 (S.D. W.Va 2010);
Bancroft v. City of Mount Vernon, 672 F. Supp. 2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Luster v. Ledbetter, 647 F.
Supp. 2d 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2009). In fact, there appears to be substantial overlap between the language
courts employ in describing the harms of publicity and the language they employ in describing the
invasiveness of strip searches generally. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364,
374–75 (2009) (describing the “indignity” of a “degrading” strip search of a student, who recounted the
experience as “embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating”). Although strip searches do not take place in
public, the reason that courts treat strip searches as categorically distinct is precisely because of this
concern for the stigma and indignity of being “seen” by “others” in a particular way.
186
William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016,
1021 (1995).
187
See, e.g., Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk and Torture-Lite: Police Terror of Minority Communities, 12
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 57 (2014); Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry
Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 (2009); Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation
Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 304–36 (2013).
188
Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 672, 723–24 (2015) (“When police use drug-sniffing dogs during a noncriminal traffic stop, they
communicate the message that the motorist is not simply a noncriminal traffic violator, but also a
potential drug criminal. These messages can have humiliating and stigmatizing effects on innocent
civilians, especially racial minority motorists more commonly subjected to drug-sniffs during pretextual
traffic stops.”).
189
Palma Paciocco, Pilloried in the Press: Rethinking the Constitutional Status of the American Perp
Walk, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 50, 101 (2013). (“The perp walk does violence to a person’s dignity and
privacy. It is a highly public, highly ritualistic event that stigmatizes and humiliates.”).
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Much like a perp walk, or a mug shot, 190 the traditional ankle monitor is an archetypal
display of criminality. It is sufficiently entwined into the American cultural consciousness, being
regularly referenced in popular culture and satirized in social media, as to be easily recognized
by most members of the public. 191 Because of the cultural meaning attached, an ankle monitor’s
presence is also expressive—its presence communicates something about both the deviance and
dangerousness of the person wearing it. 192 In contexts outside of the Fourth Amendment, the
spectacle of sex offender monitoring has found resonance with some courts. 193 In finding that
monitoring was an unconstitutional punishment, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently
opined on its stigmatizing effects:
Even though [the statute’s] purpose is not to shame Riley, the “effects” of the
scheme will have that result. If Riley were to wear shorts in a mall or a bathing
suit on the beach, or change clothes in a public locker or dressing room, or pass
through an airport, the presence of the device would become apparent to members
of the public. The tracking device attached to Riley’s ankle identifies Riley as a
sex offender no less clearly than if he wore a scarlet letter. 194
In sum, technological monitoring of sex offenders has the potential to work a particular kind of
dignitary and privacy harm, one that is increasingly cognizable in constitutional analysis
generally. 195 Unlike the intrusions discussed in prior sections, this harm emanates not from the
quantity or quality of private information collected in the government’s search, but rather from
the very spectacle of the search itself.
Fortunately, the stigmatizing potential of sex offender monitoring regimes is almost
entirely a function of the technology the government chooses to employ. This means that states
190

See id. (discussing JONATHAN FINN, CAPTURING THE CRIMINAL IMAGE: FROM MUG SHOT TO
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY viii (2009)).
191
Although the monitored offender has some ability to avoid the stigma of publicity, those efforts
may require substantial changes to one’s life, a cost that is too easily overlooked or minimized in the legal
analysis of intrusion. See supra note 167.
192
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 141.
193
Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196 (Mass. 2009) (“As ‘continuing, intrusive, and
humiliating’ as a yearly registration requirement might be, a requirement permanently to attach a GPS
device seems dramatically more intrusive and burdensome.”).
194
Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 98 A.3d 544, 559 (N.J. 2014).
195
The constitutional guarantee of Due Process similarly restricts the government from bringing an
ordinary criminal defendant to trial in shackles or prison garb, as these trappings unavoidably and
impermissibly connote guilt and dangerousness to the jury. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 627
(2005); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504–05 (1976).
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have the power to implement monitoring regimes in ways that are more or less intrusive—and
thus more or less constitutionally reasonable—both currently and in response to future
technological advances. For example, the visibility of a monitoring device is a function of its
size, shape, location, and distinctive configuration. A GPS-based monitoring device that
approximates a wristwatch, such as those popular with long-distances runners, may be less
obvious, and thus less a brand of criminality, than a traditional ankle monitor—even if an
offender cannot remove it. Similar benefits may be achieved by using of devices that may be
worn around parts of the body more frequently covered with clothing, such as the bicep or
sternum. Reducing or eliminating visible light and audible alerts may help to minimize the
attention a monitoring device draws. Not to be overlooked, increasing the reliability of the
devices used may result in reducing the police presence at the subject’s home, due either to the
need for maintenance or to false alerts. 196 Certainly these, and other, advances are already
possible.
We readily admit that the Fourth Amendment does not require the use of the bestavailable or least intrusive technology. The touchstone, as always, is reasonableness. At the same
time, courts faithful to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment should be particularly wary of
governmental choices that seem to be inviting spectacle. The history of the public pillory is not
so far behind us. Indeed, it was not so long ago that someone thought it wise to invite the media
into someone else’s private home. To ignore or minimize this dimension of intrusion in the
context of technological monitoring, even for convicted sex offenders, would be to undermine
the privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment.
IV.

Anticipating End-Runs: Is Grady Fact-Bound?
The foregoing analysis makes the case that the Fourth Amendment should meaningfully

inform how technology is deployed in monitoring sex offenders. Before concluding, we also
want to briefly anticipate and address two potential legislative choices that might be viewed as
ways around the constraints on monitoring imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Ironically, these
196

Device unreliability can also create spectacle outside of the home. For example, some monitored
individuals have described their devices losing signal in large buildings, requiring them to abruptly depart
in the middle of activities or transactions in order to re-establish the lost connection. See Brief for the
ACLU of Mich. and the Crim. Def. Atty’s of Mich. as Amici Curiae, supra note 97, at *App’x. It goes
without saying that the possibility of such a revealing occurrence is likely to chill the offender’s
willingness to engage in these everyday social (and often essential) activities in the first place.
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choices operate by dispensing with any characterization of technological monitoring as purely
civil, a characterization that has frequently insulated sex offender laws from challenge under
other constitutional provisions. These seemingly easy “solutions” will undoubtedly occur to
some legislators—perhaps those seeking to preserve the status quo in the face of technological
advances capable of reducing the invasion experienced by released sex offenders, or perhaps
those seeking to implement even more invasive technologies for other, potentially punitive,
purposes. Upon inspection, neither “solution” seems likely to permit a complete end-run of the
Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness as it applies to technological monitoring
regimes. In fact, closer scrutiny suggests they may be much less successful than one might
initially imagine.
A.

Imposing Monitoring as a Punishment

The first potential end-run occurs when governments decide to impose technological
monitoring on sex offenders as part of the explicit punishment for their crimes. A number of
states currently have laws permitting or requiring monitoring as a part of the sentence for at least
some subset of sex offenses. A quintessential example is Michigan, which statutorily mandates
lifetime electronic monitoring for anyone convicted of a first- or second-degree sex offense
involving a child under the age of 13. 197 The Supreme Court has repeatedly announced that
prisoners have a drastically diminished expectation of privacy compared to ordinary citizens. 198
One might therefore assume that imposing electronic monitoring as a kind of “technological
incarceration” will permit a much greater level of intrusion by virtue of the weakened Fourth
Amendment interests at stake under these circumstances. In addition, there may be an inclination
to discount the intrusion of technological monitoring by comparing it to the intrusion of
incarceration as an alternative punishment. 199 In fact, Judge Posner made a similar argument in
upholding Wisconsin’s civil monitoring program in Belleau. 200

197

See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520n(1) (2006).
See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
199
See, e.g., Bagaric, Hunter, & Wolf, supra note 4, at 125 (explaining that monitored offenders have
increased privacy because, “unlike the inmates of many conventional prisons, they will be free to shower,
use the toilet, and participate in other daily activities unscrutinized by others”).
200
Belleau, 811 F.3d at 932.
198
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This argument turns out to be much weaker than it might appear, however. There is
nothing talismanic about labeling a search a “punishment” that automatically diminishes the
privacy interests of the person being searched. The Supreme Court’s proclamations that
prisoners have a reduced privacy interest are the result of a practical determination about the
realities of custodial incarceration. For example, the Court famously announced in Hudson v.
Palmer that “the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply
within the confines of the prison cell.” 201 Yet it is clear that this conclusion followed from the
fact that recognizing a right of privacy in a cell—perhaps the only place inmates can reliably
conceal contraband, including weapons—would render the already extraordinarily difficult
undertaking of prison administration “literally impossible.” 202 In the same opinion, the Court
reiterated its continued insistence “that prisoners be accorded those rights not fundamentally
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration.” 203 In
other words, stripping prisoners of certain Fourth Amendment protections is done precisely and
only because it is necessary to effectuate reasonable incapacitation. 204
Moreover, when the Fourth Amendment does apply to those in prison custody, it applies
in the ordinary way. A recent opinion from the same Term in which the Court announced Jones
demonstrates this principle. Albert Florence, arrested on an erroneous bench warrant for failing
to pay a court fine, was subjected to two separate strip searches as part of the intake process at
two New Jersey correctional facilities. 205 According to Florence, the searches involved (among
other things) his completely disrobing, opening his mouth and lifting his tongue for inspection,
lifting his genitals, and coughing in a squatting position. 206 The Supreme Court was sharply
divided over whether such an extensive search was reasonable, given that there was no reason to
suspect that Florence would be concealing contraband. 207 (There was no debate that a search had
201

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
Id. at 527.
203
Id. at 523.
204
We acknowledge, of course, that the diminution of privacy experienced by prisoners may also
incidentally serve retributive goals. However, we do not read the Court’s jurisprudence to suggest that the
reduction in Fourth Amendment protection is itself a part of the punishment imposed, rather than merely
incidental to a lawful punishment.
205
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 323 (2012).
206
Id. at 323–24.
207
The Court divided 5–4, and Justice Breyer wrote a strongly worded dissent emphasizing the
humiliation and degradation involved in body cavity searches. See id. at 342 (Breyer, J., concurring).
202
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occurred.) The Fourth Amendment framework employed by the Court was the same familiar
reasonableness standard employed outside prison walls: “The need for a particular search must
be balanced against the resulting invasion of personal rights.” 208 Although the Court ultimately
held that the needs of preventing contraband from entering the general jail population
outweighed the indignity of the search, Justice Kennedy’s opinion hinted that the outcome could
easily have been different had either the government’s interest been less substantial (as in the
case of prisoners held in isolation) or the invasiveness of the search been more significant (as in
the case of a search involving physical touching). 209
Crucially, Albert Florence’s case illustrates that all Fourth Amendment searches—even
those of prisoners—must be tailored to the government’s legitimate aims. It is here that the endrun meets its end. With one notable exception, we can think of few arguments that meaningfully
distinguish the purposes of technological monitoring, when imposed as a punishment for a crime,
from those of the same monitoring when imposed as a form of civil protection, at least with
respect to the same individual. 210 Under either monitoring regime, the primary purpose of
monitoring is to deter future criminality by increasing the probability of detection. Any other
purposes can be achieved more effectively via other means (e.g., a scarlet letter). Because
increasing the probability of detection is accomplished through the collection of information, the
“search” that is monitoring should be tailored to be only as intrusive as necessary to collect the
pertinent information in a manner that supports the goal of deterrence.
It is theoretically possible that the use of more intrusive technology—a more physically
taxing device, or a device that collects more or more intimate information than needed to deter—
would also have some small general deterrent effect. We strain to imagine, however, a straightfaced constitutional advocate arguing to a court that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit an
otherwise unreasonable search because the government receives such an attenuated benefit from
208

Id. at 327 (majority opinion).
See id. at 338–39.
210
The exception is the intrusion of public stigma. In Part III.D, we concluded that the goals of a civil
sex offender monitoring regime are not furthered by a search that invites public stigma. However,
shaming punishments have seen a resurgence of interest in recent years, notwithstanding their
questionable efficacy and policy. See generally James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 (1998). It is at least plausible that a legislature could choose to
impose technological monitoring as a punishment in a manner that invites stigmatization and social
castigation. However, if these were the goals, they could be accomplished much more effectively as a
separate category of punishment, one that sends clearer signals, is less costly to maintain, and so on.
209
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the most egregious intrusions. 211 The argument proves far too much and would rob the Fourth
Amendment of nearly any bite. As the aims of both civil and punitive technological monitoring
very nearly converge, the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment should be quite
similar regardless of how the statute is labelled.
B.

Requiring Consent to Monitoring as a Condition of Parole or Probation

A second anticipated legislative end-run around the Fourth Amendment occurs when
governments require that offenders consent to monitoring as a condition of their parole or
probation. Currently, several states already approach monitoring in this way. Tying technological
monitoring to parole or probation might be thought to weaken claims of intrusiveness in two
separate ways. First, it could undermine the weight of the offender’s privacy interests in the
evaluation of whether the search was unreasonable. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that parolees and probationers exist along a spectrum of diminished privacy that includes
prisoners at one extreme and ordinary citizens at the other. The Supreme Court has invoked this
rationale twice this century, first to uphold the warrantless search of a probationer in United
States v. Knights, 212 and subsequently to uphold the warrantless search of a parolee in Samson v.
California.213 Second, if technological monitoring is a condition of parole or probation, the
search effected by that monitoring is arguably consensual. Consensual searches are a wellestablished exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of a warrant and probable
cause. 214 Indeed, Judge Posner in Belleau anticipated this tactic and described it as an
“unassailable” legislative response that would have given the plaintiff in that case a hollow
victory on Fourth Amendment grounds.
We can dispense with the first part of the argument relatively quickly, however, as the
same logic that applies to prisoners applies with perhaps greater force to probationers and
parolees. Neither Knights nor Samson held that a person’s penal status alone permits a level of
intrusion comparable to the constant electronic surveillance experienced by monitored sex

211

On that logic, the Fourth Amendment would likewise have nothing to say about imposing a daily
strip search as a punishment for a non-contraband crime, such as tax evasion.
212
Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
213
Samson, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
214
Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 509,
512 (2015).
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offenders. Rather, as always, the intrusion into privacy must be justified by the goals to be
served, including the reintegration of the offender into society and the protection of the
community. In fact, Knights held only that a one-time, warrantless search of a probationer’s
apartment was reasonable when it was supported by individualized suspicion that a probation
violation had occurred. 215 The Supreme Court left open the question whether the search of a
probationer could ever be reasonable absent individualized suspicion. 216
Samson, by contrast, did uphold the suspicionless search of a parolee (who, by virtue of
that status, had less of an expectation of privacy than a probationer). 217 Parole may therefore
provide a firmer legal foothold for suspicionless technological monitoring of sex offenders.
However, the Samson Court was explicit that the government did not have “a blanket grant of
discretion untethered by any procedural safeguards”: 218
The concern that California’s suspicionless search system gives officers unbridled
discretion to conduct searches, thereby inflicting dignitary harms that arouse
strong resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to reintegrate into
productive society, is belied by California’s prohibition on “arbitrary, capricious
or harassing” searches. The dissent’s claim that parolees under California law are
subject to capricious searches conducted at the unchecked “whim” of law
enforcement officers ignores this prohibition. 219
At first blush, the Samson Court’s reliance on a state-level policy prohibiting arbitrary,
capricious, or harassing searches seems to be cold comfort for parolees. But consider the contrast
being drawn here, and its implications for the reasonableness of technological monitoring. If the
dividing line between constitutional and unconstitutional searches of parolees is caprice—
unchecked whims, unbridled discretion—what are we to make of monitoring technologies that
subject a person to constant surveillance, that record and store the results of that surveillance for
some indefinite future use? As we previously discussed in connection with the mosaic theory of
215

Knights, 534 U.S. at 121.
Id. at 120 n.6 (“We do not decide whether the probation condition so diminished, or completely
eliminated, Knight’s reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a law enforcement officer
without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. The terms of the probation condition permit such a search, but we need not address the
constitutionality of a suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported by reasonable
suspicion.”).
217
Samson, 547 U.S. at 856.
218
Id. at 856 (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting).
219
Id.
216
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the Fourth Amendment, the aggregation of data from a constant technologically enhanced search
program is likely to be viewed differently by a court than an examination of any single search.
Samson thus suggests that the Fourth Amendment may in fact continue to be a source of
meaningful pushback to the implementation of technological monitoring, even with respect to
parolees and their diminished privacy expectations.
The issue of consent, however, is murkier. To date, the Supreme Court has explicitly
avoided the question whether an individual can consent to suspicionless searches as a condition
of probation or parole. 220 The notion that a probationer or parolee consents to technological
monitoring as a condition of release may hold intuitive appeal. After all, “consent search”
programs are a common facet of everyday life—at least for anyone who has flown on an airplane
recently. 221 In contexts such as air travel, we see consenting to governmental searches as a
worthwhile price in exchange for certain liberties. However, the legal issue is actually quite a bit
more complicated with respect to probationers and parolees (undoubtedly a reason why the
Supreme Court has so far punted). The Supreme Court has explained that consensual searches
are evaluated under the same constitutional standard as voluntary confessions—that is, they must
be free from the taint of duress or coercion, whether express or implied. 222 Even if parolees or
probationers have the choice to opt for incarceration, 223 there are substantial arguments to be
made that the conditions of such choice are coercive, and thus the consent offered is not truly
voluntary. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has long held that the government may never induce consent
to an unreasonable search by making it a condition of probation because “there is a limit on the
price the government may exact” for freedom. 224 Ultimately, the voluntariness of consent is a
question of fact to be determined from the full panoply of circumstances, including whether the

220

See id. at 852 n.3; Knights, 534 U.S. at 118.
See United States vs Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973).
222
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
223
Many do not. In some states, parole is imposed unilaterally and the offender has no option of
remaining incarcerated if he or she disagrees with the parole conditions. To speak of “consent” to search
in those circumstances would be to engage in the most unhelpful kind of legal fiction.
224
United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing United States v. ConsueloGonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc)). But, of course, this is an unsettled question, and
some courts have in fact found voluntary consent in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Yeary, 740 F.3d 569, 583 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding voluntary, uncoerced consent to warrantless searches
as a condition of pre-trial release).
221
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suspect knows that he has a right to refuse. 225 Thus the effectiveness of this strategy as a
potential end-run around the Fourth Amendment is far from obvious.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment’s command of reasonableness calls for balancing two sets of
weighty interests. There is no easy answer to the question when a proper balance has been struck.
A crucial first step is to identify the relevant factors that comprise those interests so that they can
be fairly assessed. An important goal of this Essay has been to disaggregate the key dimensions
of intrusiveness of technological monitoring, particularly in the case of convicted sex offenders
who are facing monitoring for many years or life. Notwithstanding our disaggregation, the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry is always an assessment of the totality of the
circumstances.
We can imagine different ways that this plays out in litigation. On the one hand, courts
may employ an arithmetical model of intrusion, finding that a state’s chosen monitoring
technology is reasonable whenever the aggregate intrusion is below a particular threshold. On
this model, courts may tolerate a high level of intrusion along one or more dimensions, provided
that those intrusions are offset by sufficiently minor intrusions along other dimensions.
Alternatively, the realities of litigation may tend to drive courts’ attention to the most egregious
intrusions. As a result, courts may naturally gravitate toward a low-variance model of
reasonableness that seeks to minimize outliers, even if it means a higher level of citizen intrusion
in the aggregate. Either way, we believe that policymakers seeking to design and enforce a
monitoring regime that respects the law and the spirit of the Fourth Amendment will find
guidance in this Essay. At the same time, by identifying the Fourth Amendment pressure points
of monitoring, we hope that we have provided advocates and reformers with at least some grist
for the mill when they run headlong into monitoring regimes that are unnecessarily or arbitrarily
burdensome. Technological monitoring can be tailored to fit the characteristics and
circumstances of individual convicted sex offenders and, in so doing, reduce the intrusiveness of
the search, just as the Fourth Amendment entreats the government to do.
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